By Thomas Kai Toteh

“Military consequences,” remobilization, and social disorder may or may not be taken seriously depending on whom one asks; and individual’s perspective and premise of the many threats coming from influential public officials, opposition members, and former warlords. Pessimists and optimists on Liberia’s political stability each have reason to believe why and why not to be worried over the current security atmosphere in Liberia.

Prince Johnson vows stiff resistance in the event he is indicted on war crimes. Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)’s Sekou Konneh follows suit. One of Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)’s strong men, Thomas Yaya Nimely negates the Truth and Reconciliation’s mandate and is hesitant to accept any war crimes charges brought against him. Justice Minister Philip Banks applying legal technicalities, has excluded one of the key players in the Liberian conflict, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, from appearing before the TRC.  The latest threat coming from Liberia’s main opposition party, Congress for Democracy (CDC), to disrupt the next presidential election, is yet another dark cloud hanging over Liberia.

Meanwhile, Liberians are divided between those who take these threats seriously, and those who take them for granted. Nevertheless, wherever the coin may turn, Liberians at home and abroad are hoping for the best outcome.

The best result, political analysts believe rests greatly upon the ruling class, even though ordinary Liberians can play a significant role by virtue of people’s power. However, Liberians have never exercised people’s power as enshrined in the constitution. Their constitutional power had always been violent political and military uprisings, coups, countercoups, and insurgencies from politicians’ influence.

As an interim measure, ordinary Liberians are less likely to support violent uprising in any form. Images of the 14-year-old civil war are still fresh and revisited. Former militiamen fervently denounced their former commanders and politicians -accusing them as “clever impostors” who have nothing to show for the revolution. Militiamen disowned their commanders during the early days of demobilization and rehabilitation. They blamed their commanders for deceiving them and, consequently reducing them to public hatred, ridicule, and social disorganization.

Liberians everywhere are nauseating about bad news, or any information that appear pessimistic. Liberians would prefer rather to live with the oblivion of war and make believe in the “no war is possible” theory. However, analysts think otherwise and urge Liberians to be ready for war during peacetime, especially peace that is maintained by foreign troops whose mandate is terminable.

This theory in Liberia’s march toward lasting peace seem most likely to work for the optimists of peace. Ex-militiamen are exhausted, deceived, and as a result are hesitant, or will no longer be loyal to the warlords or would-be troublemakers. Other theory is that, Liberians will unite against any form of disruption of their lives. The other theory of lasting peace is that every Liberian is mindful of the devastation the 14-year-civil war left on everyone irrespective of tribal and political affiliation. Lastly, those making threats against Liberia’s stability are no longer capable to execute any plan of resistance or their attempt will not succeed, rather they will have to confront their disasters.

Those who take these threats very seriously must have been thoughtful of Africa’s civil war history of renewed civil war, and many other factors in Liberian post-war era including social factors. The social factor/social structure theory can be tied to relative deprivation, lack of gentrification and collective efficacy, strain, and anomie.

Pessimists of lasting peace in Liberia think it is a downright fact to give credence to the former warlord’s threats because the so-called underclass of the Liberian society is still venerable to political manipulation and recruit. The probability of ex-militiamen getting involved in disturbances cannot be taken for granted based on the following theories.

Relative deprivation:

There are conditions that exist where people of wealth (undeserved wealth) and poverty live in close proximity to one another; the relatively deprived are apt to have feelings of anger and hostility, which may produce violent behavior, as already witnessed by the unstoppable wave of arm robbery in the country most of which are perpetrated by former combatants. In addition, there has not been proper rehabilitation to transform the former combatants into useful citizens. 

Collective efficacy

The warlords’ threats may stem from their observation of society, or government’s weakness among which is a lack of collective efficacy. If government or society fails to supervise the youths and help maintain public order, the youths then remains susceptible to vandalism and antisocial behavior. Vandalism is another form of achieving short-term personal goals through violence when legitimate means are not available.

Meanwhile, military analysts and observers tracking the records of the former warlords are warning the Liberian people to pay close attention to the current situation surrounding the reconciliation process, by virtue of their constitutional power. The warlords may not succeed with the inception of their resistance, but may disappear as they have done in the past and retreat, go into exile and regroup for a comeback when UN troops pull out. So far, the former factional leaders are now speaking the same language.

 Thomas Kai Toteh, is a Freelance journalist/writer